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Introduction
Countries around the world have been hit by the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2/coronavirus disease 2019 
(SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19) pandemic, and have reacted to its 
spread in very different ways. Some countries (eg, Sweden) 
have implemented minimalist public health interventions, 
while others (eg, France, New Zealand) have imposed almost 
complete population lock-downs and/or other restrictions 
to freedom of movement and privacy.1 Such extreme 
interventions have complex impacts and come at a tremendous 
(mental) health and societal cost, disproportionately affecting 
the lowest socio-economic strata, and populations in low-
and middle-income countries.2-5 However, the patterns of 
infection and mortality rates are extremely heterogeneous 
within and across individuals and countries.6,7
Complex problems are not solved by universal (untargeted) 
interventions, as these rarely result in significant change for 
target populations, and typically perpetuate existing health 
inequalities.8 Policy-makers always have to consider trade-offs 
amongst intended (positive) outcomes versus the costs and 
possible unintended (negative) consequences.9,10 Therefore, 
“strategizing” health policies entails a solid situational analysis 
and an inclusive, transparent policy dialogue with appropriate 
participation, to prioritize interventions according to relevant 
criteria, including the vulnerability of health problems, making 
sure they focus on the most cost-effective interventions and 
are proportional to the burden of the problem.11 Public health 
policies also require openness, transparency, consistency of 
messaging, opportunity to appeal decisions so as to achieve 
public confidence, and avoid distrust, paternalism, or anxiety 
in accordance with the “accountability for reasonableness 
framework.”12,13 Inclusiveness and multidisciplinarity are 
even more necessary since the COVID-19 crisis is not simply 
a health problem but a societal one, impacting every single 
person in society one way or another.14
We contend that the COVID-19 policy discourse across 
countries and continents has largely failed as they neglected 
these basic public health principles. We argue that the rapid 
growth in our understandings of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 
dynamics necessitates the regular adaptation of public health 
policies and its transparent messaging to the general public, 
high risk populations and health professionals.
This article is based on a collaboration of clinicians and 
experts in global public health and policy. We scanned the 
most relevant literature to provide a narrative review of the 
emerging evidence about SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19. 
We outline ways to better integrate the rapidly emerging 
– at times seemingly contradictory – knowledge into more 
effective public health policies, and emphasise the need to 
more appropriately and effectively communicate them to 
various constituencies.
Our Information About SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Is 
Rapidly Changing, Calling for Policy Reflections
Knowledge about COVID-19 (the disease) and its cause 
(the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2) is rapidly emerging, 
challenging effective decision-making in a context of 
uncertainty. We see marked heterogeneity in disease 
epidemiology and disease behaviour at the macro-level, with 
a relatively high level of SARS-CoV-2 sero-positivity in some 
settings. We also see heterogeneity in the biology of the virus 
and its effects on our immune responses at the micro-level, 
and their macro-level effects on transmission, pathogenicity 
and susceptibility remain poorly understood.15-18 At the 
patient-level COVID-19 exhibits highly variable symptoms – 
respiratory, neurological, gastrointestinal – that continue to 
puzzle clinicians.7,19,20 A complex picture is emerging where a 
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majority of people infected remain asymptomatic, and where 
most symptomatic people have relatively mild disease.
The epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2, and thereby its 
infectiousness, case-fatality and infection fatality rates remain 
highly contested. Compared to other pandemics, one would 
have to regard SARS-CoV-2 as moderately infectious, much 
less than measles, but more than influenza. As for its lethality, 
a model framework estimated a population infection fatality 
rates of 0.79% (with notable heterogeneity)21 and a recent 
meta-analysis found a median corrected COVID-19 infection 
fatality rate of 0.23%22 – against an infection fatality rate of 
0.1%-0.2% for influenza.23 Measles is a good illustration 
of the fact that infection fatality rates are not a constant 
variable of a disease, but depend on contextual factors and 
social determinants, and evolve over time.24 This is also 
true of SARS-CoV-2 – the elderly, people with pre-existing 
conditions, and people with high viral load exposure are at 
highest risk, so that infection fatality rates vary considerably 
between settings and by age, with consistently low infection 
fatality rates for people below 65/70 years, but high variations 
– and far higher lethality – for older patients.21,22 However, 
estimated case fatality rates – as now suggested by second 
wave figures25 – and possibly also infection fatality rates, 
are decreasing, over time, not only because we now have 
better estimations of the denominator, but also because of a 
decreased “infection density” resulting in a lower probability 
to catch the virus and develop (severe) disease.26 Given the 
difficulties of accurate attribution, it has been suggested that 
‘excess mortality’ provides a better estimate of the lethality of 
the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and its variability across countries 
(see the EuroMomo tool for European countries: https://www.
euromomo.eu/graphs-and-maps#excess-mortality). In light 
of the observed high degrees of variability, policy responses 
must be commensurate to emerging knowledge: a lower 
fatality rate than initially feared, and signs of diminishing 
risk of dying, leads to a very different appreciation when 
seen in the context of other health risks, and thus tempers 
the expected benefits of many current measures aimed at 
stopping the pandemic or even – as elusive as it may be –the 
eradication of the virus. For instance, even Belgium, where the 
fatality rate of COVID-19 is among the highest, the monthly 
fatality rate was lower than during other health emergencies 
of the last century.27
SARS-CoV-2 Is Necessary but Not Sufficient to Cause 
COVID-19
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic results in a patterned outcome 
of COVID-19 disease: only a small number develop serious 
disease associated with high mortality, primarily the 
elderly and those affected by multimorbidity.6,7,28,29 Beyond 
comorbidities, like for all health problems, social determinants 
are emerging as an important contributor in the severity of 
COVID-19.28 This means that the relationship between the 
exposure to the virus (SARS-CoV-2) and the development of 
the disease (COVID-19) – and ultimately its outcomes – is not 
‘binary,’ but is considerably influenced by additional factors. 
Put as an equation, instead of a causal linear relationship 
[SARS-CoV-2 => COVID-19], COVID-19 more realistically 
is modelled as a nonlinear relationship [(SARS-CoV-2 * X- * 
Y- * Z-Factors) => COVID-19]. A different way to put this 
is through Rothman’s lens of sufficient causes – while SARS-
CoV-2 is necessary, on its own it is not sufficient to cause 
COVID-19.
The multi-dimensional factors resulting in COVID-19 
mean it is – in many cases – difficult to attribute COVID-19 
as the cause of death rather than an association with death. The 
distinction is rarely made or transparently reported. Many 
jurisdictions count any death associated with a positive SARS-
CoV-2 swab as a COVID-19 death, which overstates the true 
fatality rate.30 According to excess death counts, other models 
underestimate the true toll of COVID-19 and/or response 
measures presenting decision-makers with contradictory 
informantion.27,31 A differentiated understanding of the 
pandemic and its consequences necessitates the distinction 
between three states: (i) exposure to the virus; (ii) infection 
with the virus; and (iii) affected by COVID-19, the disease. 
We argue that it is of critical importance for policy-making 
to make this difference because if ‘X-, Y-, Z-factors’ are 
confirmed to be important causes of the ‘transition’ from 
infection to disease, these could, and should, be targeted or 
at least recognised as a crucial aspect of long-term disease 
control policies.
COVID-19 reiterates the well-known relationship between 
comorbidities (eg, obesity and diabetes28,29), lifestyle factors 
(eg, low levels of vitamin D32) and low socioeconomic status 
on morbidity and mortality. In the context of a sustainable 
response strategy, policy should take these factors into account 
as a means to enhance broader population health benefits.33
In other words, our policy thinking about COVID-19 must 
embrace a holistic systems-in-systems approach to public 
health in order to generate more sustainable, effective and 
equitable outcomes.34 This is not to suggest that immediate 
protective countermeasures are unnecessary, in some cases 
they are crucial, especially for the highly vulnerable. However, 
given what we know of this disease (and others), the current 
ad hoc and reactive control tactics often employed have shown 
mixed results (see for instance https://ourworldindata.org/
coronavirus) and will remain sub-optimal if COVID-19 
becomes endemic or if a safe, effective, and acceptable vaccine 
fails to emerge.
Public Health Policies Need to Be Adapted Accordingly
The phrase ‘when my information changes, I alter my 
conclusions … What do you do, sir?’ is attributed to John 
Maynard Keynes. As the pandemic progresses, together with 
our knowledge about it, public health policies unavoidably 
have to adapt, and their rationale needs to be communicated 
transparently so that it can be more readily accepted by the 
public and health professionals.12 For example, the initial 
strategy of ‘flatten the curve’ (‘Save the NHS’ in the United 
Kingdom) was designed to help health systems cope with the 
anticipated surge in caseload, and to guarantee optimal in-
hospital care, as a way to minimise fatalities. Its underpinning 
rationale was straightforward and clear to a population that 
readily cooperated. This clarity unquestionably gained the 
public’s trust and support. However, in many countries, 
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subsequent policies were not adapted to emerging knowledge, 
resulting in confusing and at times conflicting messages.
For example, the constant focus on absolute numbers of 
‘confirmed cases’ and ‘registered deaths,’ without providing 
evidence on the non-registered cases or attributable deaths, 
nor providing a denominator (eg, population, cohort tested, 
age groups), renders many figures meaningless and potentially 
misleading. Paradoxically, rather than effectively adopting 
public health messages to our growing understandings of 
the pandemic, some governments suddenly switched their 
focus to ‘restarting the economy.’ This muddling of the 
public discourse has resulted in the public’s loss of trust 
and confidence in policies and decision-makers. Equally, 
measures such as the hyped-up pronouncements of SARS-
CoV-2 vaccines and antivirals, as well as the imposition of 
undifferentiated restrictions and obligations, seem to pursue 
(the overall aim rarely being disclosed) an illusionary goal of 
‘eradicating’ the virus rather than preventing the disease in the 
now known high risk groups of the elderly (especially nursing 
home residents), those with other pre-existing conditions, 
and highly exposed health professionals.
The emergence of a second wave of the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic in some countries coinciding with the realisation of 
the socio-economic consequences of the earlier lockdown has 
brought to the forefront the lack of well-thought out systemic 
policy positions. Control measures have been repeatedly 
tightened (eg, local lockdowns, quarantine after returning 
from travel abroad, school closures, wearing face masks in 
outside settings) at times when there only were a limited 
number of sick people, and despite the fact of insufficient 
evidence to support such measures.35,36 Measures adopted 
in several countries are probably not proportional to the 
severity of the threat,37 and could result in greater loss in life 
expectancy than would have been observed in their absence.10 
Untargeted measures not only risk poor efficacy, but also 
perpetuate health-destroying impacts of socio-economic 
distress, place undue pressure on vulnerable populations, 
increase inequities, and are unsustainable. By contrast, the 
controversial ‘light-touch’ Swedish model has seemingly 
proved to be more sustainable in the medium term, but also 
highlights that decision-making in the realm of uncertainty 
inevitably entails undesired outcomes, as evidenced by the 
early failure to recognise the vulnerability of nursing home 
residents.38 Managing uncertainty and complexity is inherent 
to a newly emerging pandemic. This calls for transparent 
and open deliberation with all stakeholders, acknowledging 
that emerging data is sparse and most likely flawed, that 
evidence providing certainty many never materialise, that 
paradoxical responses may emerge that are not easily or 
readily explainable, and that the implementation of pragmatic 
interventions, adapted to local settings, have the potential to 
provide important knowledge while waiting for controlled 
trial evidence to be produced.39
Ways Forward
Evidence-based policy states that the good governance of 
evidence requires transparency and conceptual clarity.40 
This begins with determining and communicating what 
the ultimate goals and concerns are, and how they should 
be addressed.41 Setting ‘the’ overarching policy goal must 
be informed by a clear understanding about the difference 
between the properties of the virus and those of the disease. 
Current ‘virus suppression policy-settings’ seem to have 
been successful in the short term, and locally, in some – but 
not all – settings (such as Iceland, South Korea, Taiwan, 
New Zealand or China – see https://ourworldindata.org/
coronavirus). However, they have been unable to control the 
pandemic globally – nor locally in more open settings – in 
a sustainable and equitably way. Indeed, the different policy 
approaches employed by individual countries have resulted 
in variable, largely unpredictable and often inequitable 
outcomes, coupled with enormous negative side effects.2,3,5,10 
Despite their obvious and at times publicly acknowledged 
failings, decision-makers continue to enforce these policies 
arguing they are unavoidable until an efficient vaccine can be 
delivered ‘to end’ the viral threat. This ‘single-minded focus’ 
fails to appreciate the systemic nature of the pandemic, and 
the need to articulate an overarching – system-wide – goal to 
manage the interconnected and interdependent medical tasks 
of prevention, protection and treatment without exacerbating 
other health risks, while maintaining social cohesion and 
preventing economic collapse.
Second, shifting towards a systems-focused overarching 
goal entails the need to change strategies. Infection control 
measures require different technical and communication 
strategies to those to protect vulnerable groups from being 
infected, or to limit the chances of ‘transition’ from infection 
to disease. Broad-based systemic public health approaches 
pay great attention to the wider determinants of disease34; in 
particular environmental factors as they are known to impact 
physiological dysregulation.42,43 A greater understanding of 
the ‘X-, Y-, Z-factors’ and their interdependencies leading to 
the ‘transition’ from infection to disease would not only be 
more effective, but also less costly (in terms of indirect effects) 
than undifferentiated universal policies.
Lastly, given the mishandling of the pandemic by political 
and public policy leaders, there is now an urgent need for 
local and national leaders to regain the confidence of their 
communities – the perception of ‘trust’ is paramount to achieve 
acceptance of policies that significantly infringe personal and 
community freedoms for the benefit of the greater good.44 
Hence, health policies need to be decided and explained based 
on a credible and consolidated evidence through an inclusive 
policy dialogue.11 However, few countries have set up such 
processes, which limits meaningful scientific debate in an 
environment dominated by an abundance of poor quality 
and/or insufficiently adapted research, competition between 
epistemic authorities,35,45 and the media, which can perpetuate 
myths in line with their respective ideological backers.
Openness, transparency and efficiency require that as 
information changes and new knowledge emerges, policy 
responses must adapt accordingly. This entails that policy-
makers must freely acknowledge past mistakes that have 
arisen due to the lack of information at the time decisions 
had to be made.46,47 It is an essential step to restore trust by 
the public, and at the same time breaks potential patterns of 
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pathway dependency and imprinting, where decision-making 
becomes resistant to change.
Conclusion
Now that we are no longer in the acute emergency phase of 
the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, and observe that the 
multisectoral crisis it caused lasts longer than anticipated, it is 
time to adopt a more systems thinking, strategic, long-term 
approach to resolving the crisis. In terms of correcting failed 
policies and addressing the foreseeable challenges, we suggest 
that public health authorities and global health leaders 
consider seven interdependent issues in future decision-
making:
• Delineate between viral infection (SARS-CoV-2 
positivity) and viral disease (COVID-19).
• Focus research on understanding the complexities 
between viral spread and disease development; identify 
which factors are responsible for the transition from 
infection to disease; identify the broader determinants of 
the pandemic; identify more clearly those at risk; identify 
what treatments can ameliorate disease severity and 
prevent mortality.
• Adopt broader policy goals aimed at optimising people’s 
health more generally (and not just control the virus); 
ensure that the enforced public health measures are 
proportional to the severity of the threat and mitigate 
their unintended consequences.
• Investigate how to expand – globally and locally – the 
implementation of appropriate preventive measures, 
treatments and public health interventions adapted to 
local contexts; support health professionals in their task 
under their local constraints.
• Better understand and attend to the needs of the most 
vulnerable populations; identify those vulnerabilities 
that are easily amenable to interventions; consider if 
policies adversely affect vulnerable populations; consider 
the balance of ‘cost-effectiveness’ in terms of impact on 
population health against the preservation of equity.
• Adapt policies and interventions in light of emerging 
knowledge (evidence-based policy-making); engage in 
transparent dialogues with all stakeholders in developing 
and implementing policy choices.
• Develop appropriate communication strategies that build 
public trust and support: transparently explain the chosen 
policy rationales and their evidence base; admit that 
there always will be indeterminacies and that emerging 
insights will result in timely adaptation of policies and 
interventions.
Ultimately only time will tell if people in given settings 
have cross-immunity through encounters with other 
coronaviruses,17 or have a more generalised ‘competence’ 
of their immune system, or if exposure to a reduced viral 
inoculum still induces some degree of immunity, with low 
risk of (severe) disease,26 or if lasting ‘herd immunity’ second 
to asymptomatic spread will emerge while vaccines remain 
under development, or if SARS-CoV-2 will just continue 
to come and go in waves as other coronaviruses do. At the 
moment, the answers to these questions remain open. So 
should our thinking: when information changes we should 
not be afraid to alter our conclusions. This is because when 
the facts and uncertainties are communicated effectively, with 
an open and transparent debate toward the collective end of 
better overall population health, it can help sharpen collective 
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